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INTRODUCTION
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. According to some reports, these assets are no longer a "nice-to-have" capability; they are essential to the armed forces' ability to conduct modern warfare. 2 But modern warfare is not only conducted from the air.
The majority of conflicts must include troops on the ground, and UAVs provide those troops exceptional support. But how did those troops, and more importantly their equipment, get to the area of operation? For the most part, the answer is by sea. Since September 11, 2001 , Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships have played a vital and continuing role in the global war on terrorism. As of July 2008, MSC ships had delivered more than 12 billion gallons of fuel and had moved 100 million square feet of combat equipment and supplies to U.S. and coalition forces engaged in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. 3 In order for those ships to first transit from their port of origin, the sea lanes of communication need to be secure. Upon arriving at the destination, it was necessary for the receiving port facilities to be accessible and secure. Mines, submarines, surface combatants, pirates and maritime terrorists have the ability to impede the transit or delivery at a variety of locations.
The overall security in the maritime domain is not solely a concern of the military when moving combat forces to and within an operating area. The same threats experienced by the military may also negatively impact maritime trade and the global economy. More than 80 percent of the world's trade travels by water and forges a global maritime link. About half the world's trade value, and 90 percent of the general cargo, are transported in containers.
Potentially more important, 75 percent of the world's maritime trade along with half of its daily oil consumptions passes through only a handful of international straits and canals as it moves between the roughly 30 primary megaports/cities in Asia, North America and Europe. 4 Thus, the safety, economic security and prosperity of nations depend on the secure use of the world's oceans. 5 The increasing requirement for securing the world's oceans, especially international transit straits and port facilities, against a plethora of threats has placed additional requirements upon the U.S. Navy and operational commanders. Vice Admiral Cosgriff, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) recently discussed the role of maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, which builds a foundation for regional security and global prosperity. He stated, "From security arises stability, which enables and enhances trade, promotes economic activity and increases local and global prosperity." 6 Although VADM Cosgriff was discussing his area of responsibility, the same logic can be applied to any region of the world.
The ever growing obligation to establish and maintain security in the maritime domain has increased the requirements of the operational commander and the forces without a significant increase in overall force size. With effective integration and employment as they are introduced into the fleet, unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) will provide a tremendous force multiplier in the same manner UAVs have accomplished over the past 20 years. 
HISTORY

MISSIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
The USV Master Plan Study Team analyzed Navy and Department of Defense guidance and generated a set of USV missions to guide future development efforts. This mission set was developed as a result of two major workshops, substantial Core Team analysis and several Flag briefings. The missions determined to be accomplished by future USVs in priority order are:
Following the determination of potential mission sets, the Master Plan Team analyzed the key attributes associated with each mission and compared the craft types and vehicle attributes against the mission needs. 12 The end result of the analysis was the establishment of the four classes of USVs described in the following paragraphs:
X-Class
The X-Class is a small (defined as 3m or less), non-standard class of systems capable of supporting SOF requirements and MIO operations. It provides a "low-end" Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capability to support manned operations and is launched from small manned craft such as the 11m Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) or the Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC). 13 The X-Class, primarily based on its size, is limited in endurance, payload capability, and seakeeping abilities. Endurance will ultimately be based on the payload. 
Capabilities
Payload packages installed on existing USVs or in development for future craft are in direct proportion to the size of craft, which delineates the mission sets that a class can accomplish. Larger craft like the Fleet Class can maintain stability while carrying more weight and are therefore capable of carrying more extensive payloads like mine countermeasure sweep gear. But a capability that is resident across all classes of USVs is surveillance and reconnaissance. Advancements in infra-red and electro-optical sensors, especially the reduction in size and power requirements, has produced equipment that can be installed on even the smallest USV. Other capabilities that exist on current and developmental USVs that produce essential information to the commander are side scan and dipping sonars, electronic warfare equipment, radars, and communications suites to transmit collected data. Weapons packages, such as torpedoes, guns, and even surface-to-surface missiles are being considered to be deployed on USVs.
Autonomy, the ability for an unmanned vehicle to conduct missions with limited or total absence of operator interaction, is a feature that is in development. In conjunction with autonomy development, the capability for obstacle and collision avoidance is being tested by various engineering corporations. These two capabilities offer multiple benefits. Since the USV is most likely not the only vessel operating in the vicinity and not all obstacles are response to emerging terrorist threats against maritime assets. 20 Protector, either a 9-meter or 11-meter remote-controlled USV, is equipped with a "mini-Typhoon" (Mk 49 Mod 0) gun system, cameras, radar and electro-optics. 21 The Singaporean navy currently employs
Protectors and has conducted operations in their territorial waters and the Arabian Gulf. 22 Sources say Israel uses Protectors, presumably off the Gaza Strip and near Lebanon, in protecting the nation's coastline from smuggling and terrorism. The Israeli navy neither confirms nor denies the claim, and has stopped commenting on USVs altogether, citing "sensitive issues."
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OPERATIONAL ART
The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs -supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience -to design strategies, campaigns and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. 24
In addition to the potential for major combat operations at sea, terrorism has significantly increased the nature of the nonmilitary, transnational, and asymmetric threats in the maritime domain that the United States and its allies and strategic partners must be prepared to counter. 25 The National Strategy for Maritime Security states, "The United States will prevent potential adversaries from attacking the maritime domain or committing unlawful acts there by monitoring and patrolling its maritime borders, maritime approaches and exclusive economic zones, as well as high seas areas of national interest, and by stopping such activities at any stage of development or deployment." 26 To support the National Joint Publication 3-0 defines "joint functions" as related capabilities and activities grouped together to help Joint Force Commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. 27 Functions common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups -command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. 28 With creative employment, USVs integrate across all functions.
Command and Control
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 29 Command and Control (C2) encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. 30 The C2 function supports an efficient decision-making process. Enabled by timely Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), the goal is to provide the ability to make decisions and execute those decisions more rapidly than the adversary. This decreases risk and allows the commander more control over the timing and tempo of operations. 31 The USV provides the commander the persistent source of information required to make the timely decisions while maintaining the forces at a safe distance from high risk situations.
Intelligence
The collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 32
Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operations. In order for the operational commander to make decisions and direct operational employment of forces to achieve the advantage, sensors and assets must be integrated and synchronized with processing and dissemination systems. UAVs have been fulfilling the sensor role for years, but the majority of operations have been focused inland. Recent developments of UAVs that can be launched and recovered from ships have assisted the maritime commander by extending the sensor range of the force while keeping helicopter crews safe. The collection of intelligence is potentially a primary role for USVs along coastlines, in and around harbors and straits, and in riverine environments. USVs provide more flexibility for the operational commander to obtain a real-time picture of the operational area, especially in hostile environments. The sensor packages provide persistent data collection above and below the surface while preventing the exposure of personnel and units to unnecessary endangerment.
Fires
The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target 33 Policy, guidance, and planning for the employment of operational and strategic fires is primarily a joint function. 34 Familiarity with UAVs has matured to the extent that a Predator UAV was used by the CIA to eliminate a terrorist in Yemen with a Maverick strike. 35 The use of armed UAVs has increased to include the arming of RQ-5 Hunters with Viper Strike precision-guided munitions. 36 To further increase the hunter-killer capability of UAVs, testing has recently been conducted to validate the deployment of GPS-guided weapons from MQ-9 Reapers. 37 Various weapon systems to include guns, missiles and torpedoes are being considered for USVs but remain as proposals and considerations. The Army has also investigated sources for remote weapons stations to use on USVs in support of service operations near the shore, in ports, and on rivers. 38 It is understandable if USVs enter the fleet without a lethal weapons capability, but just as UAVs have graduated to the position of a lethal tool, it would be anticipated that USVs will eventually reach that plateau. But USVs are capable of supporting the fires function through the use of electro-optical cameras and laser designators to provide targeting information to the shooter. The study of the associated rules of engagement and Law of the Sea concerns need to be addressed, but are outside the scope of this paper.
All fires do not include the delivery of ammunition and warheads. Nonlethal fires include information operations capabilities which focus on military actions involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to attack the enemy. 39 Sound is a powerful nonlethal weapon. In 2005, a cruise ship attacked by pirates off the Somali coast used a sonic device to ward off its assailants. 40 A USV configured with this same technology employed by the cruise ship, which is also employed by naval vessels, can provide a stand-off defensive option to deter and defeat small boat terrorist attacks. Additionally, some USVs are equipped with announcing systems that can broadcast verbal warnings to suspect vessels. With future developments, USVs will have the capability to employ electronic warfare tactics, such as jamming, which can be utilized for missions such as leading a force into an amphibious assault or through a defended choke point.
Movement and Maneuver
Movement -Moving or deploying forces into an operational area
Maneuver -Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. 41 Mines have sunk or damaged more ships than any other means of attack since World War II. 42 In enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, such as the Arabian Gulf and Yellow Sea, as well as within the world's most important choke points, such as the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, mines are a significant threat. 43 If not located and With follow-on persistent USV presence, the force will maintain the freedom of movement in the maritime environment as well as along the sea-shore interface. Placing USVs in the lead for these high risk missions keeps personnel safe and relieves multi-mission surface combatants of this tasking so they are available to take advantageous positions for potential fires support. 44 Active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communication from an adversary's attack is a primary way the protection function focuses on conserving the joint force's fighting potential. 45 USVs provide the capability to establish force protection measures in high risk situations while not placing personnel in harm's way. As demonstrated by the USV detachment deployment in 1997 to the Arabian Gulf, the capability to support the protection of forces or port facilities can be rapidly deployed and operational in theater. The USV can establish surveillance of security zones while overcoming the limitations of manned craft when considering time and weather restrictions.
Protection is not only a function to be exercised while in port. Detection of an adversary either above or below the surface at ranges outside of their weapon ranges places them in a disadvantageous position while providing friendly forces time to react to the threat.
Surveillance areas and protective barriers established using USVs enables the commander the freedom of maneuver within the area to employ multi-mission surface combatants for higher tasking such as ballistic missile defense or strike operations.
Sustainment
The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. 46 The focus of sustainment in joint operations is to provide the commander with the means to enable freedom of action and endurance and extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations; allowing the commander to seize, retain and exploit the initiative. 47 Maintaining the security of shipping lanes and the sea ports of debarkation are critical to the flow of logistics into a region of operations. The capabilities discussed for the employment of USVs in the protection function, which will lead to the freedom of movement into and maneuver within the region, will contribute to the ability to sustain the forces. In a more direct role, albeit a small role based on capacity, a USV could be utilized to make logistics runs from sea to forces ashore. Concepts of operation are also in consideration for the application of small and covert USVs (i.e. X-Class) to deliver supplies to special operations forces through riverine systems. As demonstrated by the USV detachment that operated in the Arabian Gulf at the request of COMUSNAVCENT in 1997, a detachment can deploy and be operational in theater rapidly. More investigation needs to be conducted on the feasibility of standard integration of USVs into Maritime Expeditionary Security Groups, Riverine Groups, and other small boat detachments to support emergent tasking.
RECOMMENDATIONS
An additional concept that should be investigated is not permanently installing USVs on surface combatants, but establishing a squadron and detachment structure similar to helicopter commands. Embarking helicopter detachments on air capable ships has become second nature to both aviators and surface warriors. The same can be accomplished with USV detachments. An advantage to this structure is eliminating specialized secondary training requirements in maintenance and operation of the USV and supporting equipment for the ship's crew.
CONCLUSIONS
The threats of potential nation state adversaries, terrorists, and pirates in the maritime domain are a significant concern for the military and civilian merchants alike. Although the U.S. Navy is comprised of high-tech multi-mission platforms operated by well trained and talented sailors, the area to cover is too immense for the Navy to be everywhere at all times to maintain security. The Navy has operated USVs with success in limited roles in the Arabian Gulf, as have other countries. With the proper exposure and awareness of their capabilities, USVs will be the platform of choice to conduct the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions.
Skeptics may criticize the amount of time, effort and money invested in further development of unmanned vehicles when current force structure supports the missions USVs would undertake. Realistically, the force is not significantly increasing while the requirement to establish and maintain maritime security is growing exponentially. The importance of USVs is gaining both momentum and credibility, particularly, when riverine and littoral missions are being considered. This has occurred because when due consideration is given to the attack on COLE, the attempted hijackings and attacks of vessels close to the Basra oil terminal, USVs are ideally suited to play a significant protection and surveillance role. 49 If the option is available to either task a manned craft, whether it is a surface combatant or a small craft, to a high risk mission that could be accomplished by a USV, the decision is clear -don't place the personnel at risk.
Although a number of the employment options and techniques discussed above are tactical, it is the operational commander's responsibility to consider these options into the planning process and courses of actions in order to request and allocate the most effective forces for the missions. As USVs become more common place in the operating area, they will be a remarkable force multiplier and provide the operational commander a versatile platform for conducting a variety of missions to augment the forces in gaining advantage over the adversaries.
